Type rating training standards at Part 135 operators and their contracted training centers have long been a subject of quiet professional concern, and the scenario described in this post — an underprepared sim partner receiving a passing evaluation — reflects a structural tension that exists throughout the industry. Under 14 CFR Part 135, operators must ensure crewmembers complete approved training programs and demonstrate proficiency to the standards outlined in their Operations Specifications and approved training manuals. A type rating itself is governed by Part 61 and the Airman Certification Standards (ACS), which apply uniformly regardless of the seat the applicant will occupy operationally. In theory, a Phenom 300 type rating carries identical standards whether the recipient will serve as PIC or FO. In practice, the evaluation environment is shaped by instructor judgment, operator relationships with training vendors, and the administrative and financial cost of a failure.
The "they pass almost everyone" reputation attributed to large training centers like CAE, FlightSafety, and SimCom is not without basis in the professional community, though the mechanism is more nuanced than outright leniency. These organizations operate on volume, and a disapproval — formally called a Notice of Disapproval — carries administrative weight for both the applicant and the operator. Instructors at contracted training centers are acutely aware that their employer has a commercial relationship with the Part 135 operator paying for the course. This does not necessarily mean standards are formally compromised, but it can influence how aggressively deficiencies are documented versus coached through during training days before a checkride. Extended training, additional sim sessions, and remedial work are common tools that allow an applicant to eventually meet the published standard without a formal failure — a process that benefits completion rates statistically while still technically producing a certificated airman.
The distinction between FO and PIC roles introduces a legitimate operational consideration that some in the training environment may informally absorb. Under Part 135, a First Officer does not exercise PIC authority and operates within a crew environment where the Captain is responsible for final aircraft control decisions. Some evaluators may unconsciously apply a different internal threshold to maneuver precision for an FO applicant, reasoning that the Captain provides an operational backstop. This is not codified anywhere — the ACS standards are the same — but the human element of practical test evaluation is well-documented across aviation training research. For operators placing new-hire FOs into the right seat of a complex turbine aircraft, this informal gradient can create real safety risk if the FO's actual proficiency falls short of what the certificate implies.
For working pilots and aviation operators, this matters practically because Part 135 crew pairing assumes both pilots can perform to type rating standards in degraded or abnormal scenarios. A First Officer who cannot reliably execute instrument approaches, abnormal checklists, or failure-case maneuvers to ACS standards is not simply a less-capable right-seater — they represent a latent risk in any scenario where the Captain becomes incapacitated or in CRM-intensive high-workload situations. Operators using contracted training centers should be aware that approved training program completion and FAA practical test passage are minimum thresholds, not comprehensive competency guarantees. Line checks, initial operating experience (IOE), and ongoing recurrent training under the operator's own standards are where real-world proficiency should be validated and where non-standard performance becomes an operator's direct responsibility.
Broader trends in business aviation and Part 135 operations have intensified these concerns. The ongoing pilot shortage has pushed smaller operators to hire less-experienced candidates and compress training timelines, creating pressure on training centers to deliver certificated pilots quickly. Simultaneously, the FAA's aviation safety oversight of Part 135 operators remains uneven, with smaller certificate holders receiving less frequent scrutiny than major carriers. The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists and NTSB have both flagged Part 135 training quality as a persistent safety concern in recent years. Pilots entering these environments — whether as PIC or FO — should treat their training center type rating as a floor, not a ceiling, and pursue self-directed proficiency well beyond the minimum demonstrated in the sim.