The practice of intentionally flying below the published or desired glidepath on final approach — colloquially known as "ducking under" or the "carrier landing" technique — has surfaced again as a point of professional debate among transport and commercial pilots, prompted by a series of high-visibility unstable approach incidents at short-runway airports. The technique, as described by one experienced CRJ operator, involves deliberately dipping below glideslope to ensure touchdown near the thousand-foot markers, ostensibly to maximize available stopping distance. The original poster recounts observing a captain execute this maneuver on a 9,000-foot runway, only to watch the approach devolve into uncomfortable low-altitude deviations that still resulted in a long touchdown — arguably the worst possible outcome of the technique, combining the hazards of a low approach with none of the intended benefit of an early touchdown.
The core safety objection to ducking under is not merely procedural but rooted in the physics of energy management and the limitations of human perception in the flare. When a crew intentionally flies below glidepath, they alter the energy state of the aircraft in ways that are difficult to precisely control, particularly during the transition from approach to flare. Descent rates, airspeed, and sink rate at threshold all shift from the conditions under which landing performance data was computed. Certified landing distance figures for transport-category aircraft are based on a standardized approach profile — typically crossing the threshold at 50 feet above ground level, on speed, on glidepath. Any intentional deviation from that profile invalidates the applicability of those numbers, meaning crews who duck under to "save runway" may actually be operating without a reliable performance baseline while simultaneously increasing the risk of a hard landing, tail strike, or controlled flight into terrain on short final.
From a regulatory and operational standpoint, virtually every Part 121 and Part 135 operator's operations specifications and stabilized approach criteria are built around adherence to a defined glidepath, not deviation from it. The FAA, ICAO, and Flight Safety Foundation guidance all converge on the principle that a stabilized approach — defined by glidepath, airspeed, configuration, and sink rate within prescribed tolerances by a defined gate altitude — is the single most reliable predictor of a safe landing outcome. Crews who self-authorize alternate approach geometries, even with good intentions regarding runway occupancy, are operating outside the tested envelope and outside the construct of their company's safety management framework. The stabilized approach concept exists precisely because ad hoc technique variations, however well-intentioned, introduce variability that accident data has repeatedly shown to be hazardous.
The broader context here involves a persistent tension in professional aviation between ingrained airmanship habits — some of which predate modern jet operations and trace back to propeller-era or military techniques — and evidence-based standard operating procedures. The "carrier landing" framing is particularly telling: carrier aviation involves purpose-built aircraft, arrested landing systems, precise glideslope control via the optical landing system, and highly standardized crew training optimized for a completely different threat environment. Transposing that technique to a regional jet on a 9,000-foot runway conflates two fundamentally dissimilar operational contexts. The fact that this technique continues to circulate in professional cockpits, even informally, points to an ongoing need for chief pilots and training departments to address glidepath discipline not just as a checklist item but as a subject of meaningful recurrent discussion — particularly as approach and landing accidents remain among the leading causes of hull loss events in commercial and business aviation worldwide.
For corporate and business aviation operators flying Part 91 and 135, the issue carries additional weight. Without the institutional oversight structures of a major airline — including line checks, FOQA/FDM programs, and ASAP reporting systems — deviations from standard approach profiles in business jet operations can go uncorrected for longer and become normalized within a particular flight department's culture. Pilots flying jets into challenging short-field destinations such as Aspen (ASE), Telluride (TEX), or London City (LCY) face genuine pressure to deliver precise touchdowns, but the answer to that pressure is rigorous adherence to the procedures specifically developed for those airports — many of which include specialized approach profiles, reduced flap configurations, or specific company guidance — not improvised glidepath modifications developed in the cockpit.