A viral video showing a Boeing 767 executing what appeared to be a labored, late go-around has prompted a wave of public curiosity about the aerodynamics and procedural logic behind missed approaches—questions that, while basic to transport-category pilots, reveal how counterintuitive go-around dynamics can look to the untrained eye. The core observation, that a jet at apparent full thrust seemed to climb sluggishly and rotate near the departure end of the runway, is not unusual. It reflects the reality that engine spool-up on high-bypass turbofans is not instantaneous, and that a go-around initiated late in the flare or after touchdown starts from a low-energy state: slow airspeed, high angle of attack, low altitude, and a thrust lever movement that must overcome inertia in a large rotating mass before EPR or N1 targets are reached. On a widebody like the 767, that spool time from idle or near-idle to TOGA thrust can run several seconds, during which the aircraft is essentially trading proximity to the ground for the time needed to accelerate, rather than climbing briskly.
The questions about VREF and go-around speed margins get at something pilots train on repeatedly but rarely have to explain from first principles. Unlike takeoff, where V1, VR, and V2 are calculated from balanced field length, weight, and engine-out climb gradient requirements, approach speeds are built around VREF—1.3 times stall speed in the landing configuration, adjusted for wind additives, gusts, and icing or other factors per the AFM. That VREF-based approach speed inherently carries a stall margin sufficient to allow a go-around to be initiated at any point on the approach, including in the flare, without immediate risk of stalling, even before thrust fully develops. This is precisely why go-around procedures emphasize an initial pitch attitude target rather than a numerical speed target: the aircraft is flown to a pitch attitude (often 15 degrees or a flight-director-commanded attitude) that arrests descent and initiates a climb using existing energy and lift, while thrust catches up. Airspeed may briefly stagnate or even decay slightly during this phase—which is likely what created the visual impression of sluggish climb performance in the video—before the aircraft accelerates as thrust reaches target values and configuration is cleaned up (flap retraction schedule, gear up, etc.).
This matters operationally because go-arounds performed late, near or at the runway threshold, are among the highest-workload, highest-risk maneuvers in transport aviation, and they are a persistent focus of industry safety initiatives. Flight Safety Foundation data and multiple airline FOQA programs have repeatedly shown that go-around non-compliance—crews continuing an unstabilized approach rather than executing a go-around—is a leading contributor to runway excursions and CFIT risk. Conversely, when a go-around is correctly executed late in the approach or even after touchdown (a "rejected landing" or "balked landing," distinct from a standard go-around), the procedure is designed with enough built-in margin, provided the aircraft was on-speed and in a normal configuration, to make the maneuver safe despite looking dramatic from the ground. The apparent late rotation and slow initial climb in videos like this one are often simply the visible signature of that spool-up lag combined with the pitch-first, thrust-catches-up logic embedded in go-around procedures, rather than an indication of marginal performance.
For working pilots, the broader relevance lies in recurrent training and CRM culture around go-around decision-making. Airlines have increasingly pushed "no-fault go-around" policies specifically to counter the psychological pressure to continue an approach rather than execute a maneuver that, to passengers and ground observers, can look alarming even when performed correctly and within all performance margins. Simulator training scenarios increasingly emphasize late-stage go-arounds, including balked landings from near or at touchdown, precisely because crews need repetition with the sensory experience of low airspeed, high pitch, and a multi-second wait for thrust before the aircraft visibly responds. Public videos like this one, misread as showing marginal or unsafe performance, actually illustrate why standardized pitch-and-power techniques and conservative approach-speed margins exist: they convert what looks like a struggle into a fully controlled, certificated maneuver with performance margins the crew, though not always the casual viewer, can rely on.