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● SF PRESS ·Jake Hardiman ·July 10, 2026 ·10:08Z

Ouch: Air Canada Inspecting Damage On Boeing 737 MAX 8 That Veered Off Runway In Montréal

An Air Canada Boeing 737 MAX 8 suffered a runway excursion at Montreal-Trudeau International Airport after landing from Los Angeles on July 9, 2026, with 162 passengers and crew on board, veering onto the grass adjacent to the taxiway without causing injuries. The incident triggered temporary ground stops and flow restrictions at the airport, resulting in significant operational disruption with 27 departing flights cancelled and 130 delayed, while the aircraft was taken out of service for a full inspection in the hangar.
Detailed analysis

Air Canada Flight AC774's runway excursion at Montréal-Trudeau on July 9 adds another data point to an already crowded ledger of 737 MAX-related ground incidents, even though this event appears to be a straightforward taxiway/runway transition excursion rather than anything tied to the aircraft type's more infamous MCAS history. The Boeing 737 MAX 8, registration C-GEOJ, touched down 41 minutes ahead of schedule after a 4.5-hour flight from LAX, then departed the paved surface while transitioning from the runway onto the taxiway, coming to rest in the grass. With 162 souls on board and zero injuries reported, this is fundamentally a good outcome from a bad situation—but the operational fallout, including a Nav Canada ground stop, flow restrictions, and a jet pulled from service for hangar inspection, illustrates how quickly a single ground-handling anomaly can cascade into system-wide delay.

For working pilots, the key professional interest here lies in the "why." Runway excursions during rollout or the runway-to-taxiway transition are typically traced to a combination of factors: crosswind or gusty conditions, contaminated or degraded surface friction, asymmetric braking or reverse thrust application, taxiway geometry, or a simple loss of directional control at low speed. Montréal was also dealing with adverse weather that day, which the article notes contributed to the broader disruption alongside the incident itself. Until the TSB (Transportation Safety Board of Canada) releases findings, crews flying into YUL—or any airport with similarly configured high-speed exits—should treat this as a reminder that low-speed excursions remain a persistent risk category even on modern, well-equipped narrowbodies. Line pilots often focus training and simulator time on high-consequence events like V1 cuts or windshear, but excursions during rollout and taxi are statistically more common and deserve equal respect in briefings, particularly regarding runway condition reports, exit speed discipline, and NOTAMs on taxiway surface conditions.

From an operational and fleet-management perspective, this incident underscores the ripple effects that even a "no-injury" ground event can generate. Pulling C-GEOJ from service canceled its subsequent San Francisco rotation and forced Air Canada to scramble replacement aircraft or accept schedule gaps, while YUL's citywide numbers—27 cancelled and 130 delayed departures, plus 113 delayed and 24 cancelled arrivals—show how a single-aircraft event, compounded by weather, can degrade an entire hub's on-time performance for a full day. This is a useful case study for dispatchers, ops controllers, and crew scheduling teams: aircraft-on-ground (AOG) events at busy hubs don't just remove one tail from the rotation, they can trigger protective ATC measures (ground stops, flow restrictions) that throttle the whole airport's throughput regardless of whether other aircraft are involved.

Broadly, this event fits into a recurring pattern across commercial aviation where MAX-family aircraft draw outsized scrutiny for any incident, fair or not, given the type's regulatory and public-relations history. Airlines and OEMs remain acutely aware that even minor mishaps involving the 737 MAX generate disproportionate media attention, which places extra pressure on carriers like Air Canada to communicate transparently and act quickly—hence the immediate decision to tow the aircraft for a full inspection rather than a cursory check. For business and GA operators watching from the sidelines, the incident is also a reminder that excursions aren't confined to smaller aircraft or less experienced crews; they can happen to major-carrier operations flying mature, well-maintained widebody-adjacent narrowbodies under experienced two-crew operations. As investigators examine C-GEOJ's data and Montréal's runway/taxiway conditions from that day, the findings will likely feed into recurrent training discussions industry-wide about exit-speed management and directional control during the transition from runway to taxiway.

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