A student pilot's forum post seeking information about a specific Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) named Dilakshan Poholiyadde highlights a recurring friction point in the private pilot certification process: the subjective application of the Airman Certification Standards (ACS) during checkrides. The poster describes a failed initial attempt in which the DPE cited improper emergency checklist usage during a simulated engine failure, despite the applicant executing the memory items correctly before transitioning to the checklist. The applicant contrasts this with praise received elsewhere in the same ride, such as a short-field landing performed precisely on target versus the more lenient 1,000-foot touchdown zone tolerance, suggesting a checkride where the failure point felt disproportionate to overall performance. Now facing a recheck with a different examiner in two days, the applicant is crowdsourcing intelligence on examiner tendencies, a common practice among applicants trying to calibrate expectations before a high-stakes evaluation.
This scenario is worth understanding for CFIs and DPEs alike because it underscores the ACS requirement that emergency procedures be conducted "in accordance with the checklist," even when memory items are correctly executed first. The FAA's ACS framework explicitly expects applicants to verify memory-item actions against the printed or electronic checklist once time and altitude permit, and failure to do so — even after correctly performing the initial recall items — can constitute a notice of disapproval under the Task's "special emphasis" areas on checklist usage and single-pilot resource management. This is a frequent source of confusion for primary students, who are taught to prioritize the immediate memory items (mixture, carb heat, best glide, field selection) but sometimes neglect the follow-up step of transitioning to the checklist to confirm nothing was missed or to complete secondary items like transponder squawk, mayday calls, or fuel shutoff. DPEs vary in how strictly they enforce this transition, and that variability — real or perceived — is precisely why threads like this proliferate on pilot forums; applicants are effectively trying to reverse-engineer an examiner's personal standard-application before walking into the airplane.
For working CFIs, this case is a useful teaching moment: instructors should explicitly brief students that "memory items, then checklist" is not optional flourish but a testable procedure, and should simulate the full sequence — including the moment of picking up the checklist after stabilizing on best glide — during every engine-failure scenario in training. For DPEs, the episode is a reminder that consistency and clear real-time feedback matter; an applicant who nails altitude, airspeed, and landing precision but fails on a procedural technicality benefits from clear debriefing on exactly what standard was applied and why, both to support learning and to reduce examiner-shopping behavior in the applicant community.
Broadly, this incident reflects an enduring tension in the U.S. flight training pipeline as it strains under a persistent instructor and examiner shortage: applicants often wait weeks or months for checkride slots, DPE availability is uneven regionally, and a single failed item can mean significant schedule and cost impact, reinforcing the incentive to research examiners informally rather than relying solely on standardized ACS language. As primary pilot training volume continues to grow — driven by airline pipeline demand and general aviation's slow post-pandemic recovery — expect continued informal crowd-sourcing of examiner reputations, and continued calls within the industry for more standardized examiner calibration and clearer FAA guidance on how memory-item-to-checklist transitions should be scored during single-engine emergency procedures.