The question raised in this forum post touches on a preflight inspection detail that, while seemingly minor, reflects a broader inconsistency in how flight training is conducted across the general aviation instructional landscape. The student, a 56-hour Cessna 172P pilot approaching a private pilot checkride, noticed that many instructional videos include a step where the master switch is turned on during preflight specifically to verify flap operation and exterior/interior lighting function—a step their CFI at a small Part 61 flight school never emphasized. This is not a matter of regulatory ambiguity; the practice of cycling the master switch to check flaps, position lights, strobes, landing lights, and panel lighting is a well-established best practice found in most Cessna Pilot's Operating Handbooks (POH) and is explicitly included in factory checklists for the 172 series, including the Skyhawk with 180hp STC modifications common in flight training fleets.
For working pilots and flight instructors, this scenario underscores a persistent quality-control challenge in primary flight training, particularly at small "mom and pop" Part 61 operations where standardization can vary significantly from one instructor to the next. Unlike Part 141 programs, which operate under an FAA-approved training syllabus with defined stage checks, Part 61 instruction relies heavily on individual CFI judgment and experience. This flexibility is often a strength, allowing for tailored instruction, but it can also mean that certain checklist items or safety-relevant habits get inconsistently taught. A functional check of flaps and lights during preflight is not just a boxes-checked exercise—it verifies that the flap motor and asymmetry protection systems are working before the aircraft is airborne, and confirms that lighting equipment required for night operations, per 14 CFR 91.205, is serviceable before it's needed. Missing this step doesn't necessarily create an unsafe airplane, but it does represent a gap in verifying airworthiness items that are cheap and easy to catch on the ground.
From a checkride readiness standpoint, DPEs frequently evaluate a candidate's preflight against the POH-published checklist verbatim, and deviations—especially omissions of published steps—can become discussion points during the oral or a demonstrated weakness during the practical. Examiners are trained to assess whether an applicant uses the aircraft's approved checklist as a reference, not from rote memory alone, and flap/light verification is a textbook example of an item examiners commonly probe with "why do we do this" follow-up questions. Students preparing for a checkride are well served by cross-referencing their instructor's taught preflight flow against the actual POH checklist for their specific airframe and equipment configuration, since STC modifications (such as the 180hp conversion mentioned) can sometimes introduce supplemental checklist items beyond the stock Cessna procedures.
More broadly, this incident is emblematic of ongoing conversations within the CFI community about training standardization, especially as the industry grapples with an accelerated CFI pipeline driven by airline hiring demand and pilot shortage pressures. Newer instructors, sometimes building hours quickly toward airline careers, may inadvertently pass along habits or omissions from their own training rather than deliberately teaching from the published checklist. Flight schools and DPEs alike continue to emphasize checklist discipline as a foundational habit that transfers directly into higher-performance and turbine aircraft, where systems checks during preflight become significantly more consequential. For student pilots, the takeaway is straightforward: preflight procedures should always be validated against the aircraft's specific POH or AFM rather than solely against what one CFI happened to demonstrate, and any discrepancy discovered—as in this case—is worth raising proactively with an instructor before the checkride rather than after.