A CFI's forum post recounting a pilot deviation during IFR training illustrates how quickly a routine circling approach can spiral into a compliance problem when instructor and student judgment diverge from ATC expectations in real time. The flight was a round-robin IFR training mission between two Class C airports with a non-towered field as the practice stop. While flying the RNAV 31 approach circling to Runway 23, ATC had issued alternate missed-approach instructions—a specific heading and altitude with instructions to remain on frequency—rather than the published miss. When the student elected to touch and go and then floated long on the landing, the instructor's call for an immediate full-power go-around was overridden by the student's discomfort with an immediate rejected landing, and the crew opted for a full stop instead. That single decision point, an in-the-moment risk trade-off by the flight crew rather than a coordinated change with ATC, is what ultimately triggered the deviation finding.
The chain of events that followed compounded the problem. Unable to raise ATC while taxiing back at the non-towered airport, the crew made an independent decision to depart again "as soon as practical" using the same IFR clearance and squawk code, reasoning that lingering at low altitude over a populated area was the greater hazard. From a pure safety standpoint, that judgment call is defensible—loitering over a beach at low altitude with an aircraft that had just landed unexpectedly carries its own risk profile. But from a regulatory and ATC-coordination standpoint, departing IFR from an uncontrolled field without a new clearance, after having already deviated from the assigned missed-approach sequence, effectively created an aircraft ATC believed to still be executing one plan while it was executing another entirely. The controller's own reaction—initial concern that there had been an accident—underscores the core issue: ATC lost positive awareness of the aircraft's status and intentions during the ground period, which is precisely the scenario IFR separation and sequencing depend on avoiding.
For working pilots and instructors, this case is a clean illustration of why "expect" instructions and contingency clearances (like alternate missed-approach headings) exist as a tightly coupled contract between aircraft and ATC, and why any deviation from that contract, even one made for sound safety reasons, needs to be communicated as early as possible rather than resolved unilaterally. At a non-towered airport under IFR, the moment a full stop replaces a planned touch-and-go and missed approach, the original clearance is arguably no longer valid for the subsequent departure, particularly when several minutes elapse and the aircraft repositions on the ground. Many training operations and standard callouts emphasize that IFR aircraft at non-towered fields should attempt to contact ATC before taxiing for departure, or if unable, should treat the situation as it did here: depart, climb to a safe altitude, and establish contact as soon as possible—which is what ultimately happened. The deviation was procedural rather than a loss of separation or terrain event, but pilot deviations of this type still generate an official record and, if not mitigated through NASA ASRS filing, can affect certificate action exposure.
This scenario also speaks to broader trends in flight training environments that rely heavily on Class C-to-Class C round-robins with non-towered intermediate stops, a common profile for building instrument proficiency efficiently. As training throughput increases and CFIs manage real-time student decision-making under IFR, the margin for miscommunication with ATC narrows, especially when alternate missed-approach instructions are already in play rather than the published procedure. Operators and flight schools running similar syllabi would do well to brief students and instructors explicitly on the decision tree for an unplanned full stop during a circle-to-land exercise: when to declare intentions to ATC immediately via phone or radio before repositioning, and how to treat the ground period as effectively voiding the existing IFR clearance until reestablished. The NASA ASRS filing in this case was the correct follow-up step, and the instructor's public post-mortem reflects the kind of just-culture learning that keeps training environments safe even when procedural deviations occur.